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Abstract 
In 1999 the UK government made major reforms to the system of child-contingent 
benefits, including the introduction of Working Families’ Tax Credit and an increase 
in means-tested Income Support for families with children.  Between 1999-2003 
government spending per-child on these benefits rose by 50 per cent in real terms, a 
change that was unprecedented over a thirty year period.  This paper examines 
whether there was a response in childbearing.  To identify the effect of the reforms, 
we exploit the fact that the spending increases were targeted at low-income 
households and we use the (exogenously determined) education of the woman and her 
partner to define treatment and control groups.  We argue that the reforms are most 
likely to have a positive fertility effect for women in couples and show that this is the 
case.  We find that there was an increase in births (by around 15 per cent) among the 
group affected by the reforms.   
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Executive Summary 
 
In 1999 the UK government made major reforms to the system of child-contingent 
benefits, including the introduction of Working Families' Tax Credit and an increase 
in means-tested Income Support for families with children.  Between 1999-2003 
government spending per-child on these benefits rose by 50 per cent in real terms, a 
change that was unprecedented over a thirty year period.  This paper examines 
whether there was a response in childbearing.  To identify the effect of the reforms, 
we exploit the fact that the spending increases were targeted at low-income 
households and we use the (exogenously determined) education of the woman and her 
partner to define treatment and control groups.  We argue that the reforms are most 
likely to have a positive fertility effect for women in couples and show that this is the 
case.  We find that there was an increase in births (by around 15 per cent) among the 
group affected by the reforms. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of welfare on fertility from the UK, 
focusing on a set of reforms to benefits for families with children introduced in 1999.  
The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), similar in design to the US Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), increased the generosity of benefits for households with 
children where at least one parent worked 16 hours a week or more,2 while the 
generosity of means-tested Income Support (IS) payments to workless households 
with children also increased.   
The UK makes a good case study because of the sheer scale of the reforms.  Between 
1999 and 2003, government spending per child on child-contingent cash transfers, 
payable tax credits and traditional tax allowances increased by 50 per cent in real 
terms, a change that was unprecedented over the previous thirty year period (Adam 
and Brewer, 2004).  Most of the additional spending was targeted at low-income 
households.  For the poorest one-fifth of couples with children, the changes increased 
cash benefits received for the first child by an amount equivalent to ten per cent of net 
household income.  Since the main aims of the reforms were to improve work 
incentives (in the case of WFTC) and to reduce child poverty, there was no pro-
natalist intention and therefore little concern about policy endogeneity in examining 
the effect of the reform on fertility (see Besley and Case, 2000).    
The employment effects of WFTC have been extensively analysed (see inter alia 
Gregg and Harkness, 2003, Blundell et al, 2005, Brewer et al, 2006, Francesconi and 
van der Klauuw, 2007, Leigh, 2007 and Gregg et al, 2009).  Similar to the US studies 
                                                 
2 The reforms have been extensively documented elsewhere.  For further details, see Brewer et al (2006), Francesconi and van 
der Klaauw (2007), Gregg and Harkness (2003) and Leigh (2007).  
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of EITC (see Eissa and Leibman, 1996, and Eissa and Hoynes, 2004), these studies 
find a significant increase in employment among lone parents, but little overall effect 
on the employment of women in couples.  There has been far less analysis of the 
impact of the UK reforms on fertility although this is an important, if possibly 
unintended, consequence of the reforms.   
The only previous study of WFTC to consider fertility, Francesconi and van der 
Klauuw (2007), focused on lone mothers and found a (statistically insignificant) 
reduction in the probability of lone mothers having another child after the reforms 3.  
However, as we argue below, the fertility incentives of the reforms for this group are 
ambiguous because the improved work incentives offered by WFTC could cause a 
reduction in fertility by raising the opportunity cost of an additional child.  In our 
analysis, we focus on couples where the likely positive fertility effects are stronger.   
Much of the existing evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility comes from 
the US where studies have typically exploited variation in program generosity and 
timing of implementation across states to identify an effect. In general, the US 
evidence finds that more generous welfare is associated with increased births (see 
Moffitt, 1998), although the results are sensitive to specification.  
Since the UK reforms were nation-wide, we cannot follow the US studies in 
identifying the policy effect from variation across state and time.  Instead, we exploit 
the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households and adopt the 
commonly-used difference- in-difference approach (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999).  
                                                 
3 Ohinata (2008) uses the British Household Panel Survey to look at the effect of WFTC on fertility 
using a difference in differences approach.  She conditions on pre-reform household income, in effect 
selecting heavily on pre-reform fertility.   
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We look at the change in fertility before and after the reform for couples who were 
affected by the reform and use the change in fertility over the same period for couples 
unaffected by the reform to control for other (unobservable) time-varying effects.  
While this methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual policy effects, it can 
yield powerful and straightforward evidence on behavioural impacts (Ellwood, 1999).  
Because household income is likely to be affected by the reform, we use the education 
of the woman (and her partner) to define treatment and control groups.  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  The following section summarizes 
the previous literature in this area.  Section 3 describes the UK reforms in further 
detail, and section 4 discusses the possible effect of the reforms on the incentives to 
have children.  Sections 5 and 6 describe our empirical strategy and the data we use.  
Section 7 presents the results of regression analysis and section 8 offers some 
conclusions.   
2 Previous research 
According to a basic economic model of fertility (see Becker, 1991), more generous 
government support for children would tend to raise the desired number of children 
through both a positive income effect4 and a positive own price effect.  There is a 
large US literature that tries to test this prediction with regard to welfare programs, 
much of it focusing on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (see Moffit, 
1998, for an overview).  Identification in studies of AFDC typically relies on variation 
in generosity across states and, although there is clearly a positive statistically 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, it has been argued that higher income is associated with demand for increased quality of children, implying a 
possible reduction in quantity demanded. 
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significant correlation between welfare generosity and fertility, the results are 
sensitive to methodology and in particular, the inclusion of state fixed effects and 
trends (see Hoynes, 1997).   
Of particular relevance to the UK 1999 reforms, a recent paper by Baughman and 
Dickert-Conlin (2003) looks at the effect of EITC on fertility.  Focusing on first births 
and on women with less than college education, who are likely to be more affected by 
the reforms, they exploit variation in state EITC payments to identify an effect.  They 
control for state fixed effects and time-varying policy and economic variables, but not 
state trends.  Overall, they find that more generous EITC benefits have a negative 
effect on first births, although this is statistically insignificant.  But they find a 
positive effect for married women and a larger effect for non-whites.  In section 4 
below we argue that positive fertility effects are more likely for women in couples and 
we focus on this group in our analysis, exploiting the fact that around half of recipient 
WFTC families are couples. 
A number of other papers provide evidence that total fertility is responsive to 
government policy.  Whittington et al (1990) use time series data from 1913 to 1984 
to show that changes in the personal tax exemption for dependents in the US had a 
significant effect on the number of children born, with an implied elasticity of 
between 0.127 and 0.248, while Whittington (1992) finds the same relationship using 
micro-data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, with an estimated elasticity 
in the range 0.23 – 1.31.  For the UK, Ermisch (1988) finds that the magnitude of 
(universal) child benefit payments has an effect both on timing of entry into 
motherhood and on family size through third and fourth births.  The simulated effect 
of doubling the real value of child benefit on family size is of similar (absolute) 
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magnitude to the effect of doubling house prices.   
A number of studies have looked at the effect of explicitly pro-natalist policies.  
Laroque and Salanie (2005) examined the effect of the Allocation Parentale 
d’Education (APE) introduced in France in 1994.  In a discrete choice framework, 
they relate employment and fertility choices to the financial incentives implied by the 
tax and benefit system, and they find evidence of a small effect of the APE on 
childbearing, higher for first births, in spite of the fact that the benefit was paid in the 
event of higher order births ; Laroque and Salanie (2008) generalise this and find 
evidence that first and third births in France are responsive to financial incentives.  
Milligan (2005) studied the effect of the Allowance for Newborn Children (ANC) 
introduced in Quebec in 1998, which paid 500 Canadian dollars for the first birth, 
$1,000 for a second birth (split into two annual payments) and up to $8,000 for a third 
birth (split into twenty quarterly payments).  Exploiting the fact that the reform was 
introduced in Quebec and not in the rest of Canada, he estimated that the policy raised 
fertility by 12% in the case of first births and 25% in the case of third and subsequent 
births.  He estimated that a $Can 1,000 increase in government support in the first 
year would increase the probability of having a child by 16.9%.  Perhaps surpris ingly, 
he found a bigger effect for higher income families. 
Finally, a closely related literature has examined whether tax and transfer policy can 
affect the timing of births (these studies have typically assumed the quantity of births 
is unaffected). Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2008) and Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 
(1999) show that the operation of child tax deductions can encourage families to have 
children born towards the end of the fiscal year, rather than at the start (in Japan and 
the US respectively). Gans and Leigh (2006) show that the high-profile announcement, 
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seven weeks in advance, of a AUS$ 3000 bonus to babies born in Australia after July 
1 2004 led to the situation where “on July 1 2004, more Australian children were born 
than on any other single date in the past thirty years”.  
3 The reforms to child-contingent cash benefits in the UK 
Our focus in this paper is on a set of reforms in the UK that increased the generosity 
of government support to families with children that was initiated by the incoming 
Labour government in 1997 and introduced in 1999.  Drawing extensively on the 
experience of welfare-to-work programs in North America, the Working Families’ 
Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in October 1999 to provide improved work 
incentives for families with children, together with a number of additional programs, 
such as the New Deal for Lone Parents, offering training and other help with finding a 
job.  Alongside this, however, the government also increased the generosity of means-
tested income support payments to families with children. In this section we describe 
first the WFTC reform, and then the contemporaneous changes to welfare benefits 
and income tax, before finally analysing how the combined package of reforms 
affected the incomes of families with children. 5   
WFTC in fact represented a dramatic expansion and rebranding of an existing, small, 
in-work cash support program known as Family Credit (FC).  Both WFTC and FC 
paid money to recipients working for at least 16 hours per week, tapered away with 
household6 earnings (plus some other forms of income) above a threshold.  But 
WFTC was more generous in five ways: credits were higher, particularly for those 
                                                 
5  This discussion draws on Brewer and Browne (2006) and Brewer et al (2006).  We do not describe the further set of reforms 
that took place after April 2003: for further details see Brewer (2003). 
6 The assessment was made on the basis of the couple’s joint earnings even in the case of cohabiting couples. 
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with younger children; families could earn more before the credit began to be 
withdrawn; the rate at which the credit was withdrawn was lower; support for formal 
childcare was more generous; and WFTC excluded child maintenance payments from 
its definition of income.  Figure 1 (from Brewer, 2001) compares the WFTC schedule 
with that of the US equivalent, EITC, for the fiscal year 2000.  It shows, compared 
with EITC, the absence of a phase- in portion for WFTC, the greater generosity of 
WFTC (at PPP rates) and the steeper phase-out of WFTC.  
Take-up of the new programme increased quite dramatically.  The number of 
households with children in receipt of credits rose from 786,000 in August 1999, just 
before WFTC was introduced, to 1,327,000 in November 2002.  This compares to a 
total of 6.98m families claiming (universal) child benefit in November 2002.  Just 
under one-half of WFTC recipients (46%) were in a couple.7   
                                                 
7 There was no attempt to present these reforms as revenue neutral: annual expenditure on FC/WFTC almost doubled between 
1998–99 and 2000–01, from £2.68 billion to £4.81 billion in const ant 2002 prices, with a further increase by 2002 to £6.46 
billion. 
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Figure 1 
WFTC and EITC schedules compared, 2000 
 
The introduction of WFTC was not the whole story; other income tax allowances and 
transfer programs were available to families with children during the period under 
consideration, and most saw some change at the same time as WFTC was introduced. 
Child benefit, a cash benefit available to all families with children regardless of 
income, saw a small increase in the amount paid in respect of the first child; welfare 
benefits for families on a low income and working fewer than 16 hours a week saw 
considerable increases in the amounts paid in respect of children, and a small non-
refundable income tax credit for parents was introduced in 2001. 
Overall, this combined set of changes amounted to a huge increase in the total 
package of child-contingent cash support from the state, whether provided through 
cash benefits, in-work tax credits or income tax deductions: government spending on 
all child-contingent support programs rose by 50 per cent in real terms between 1999 
and 2003 (Adam and Brewer, 2004) a change that was unprecedented over a thirty 
year period. But the change was far more important for low-income families than 
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better-off families, because the rise in spending was dominated by the means-tested 
WFTC and the higher means-tested out-of-work benefits for families with children.   
Figure 2 shows the change over this period in income from child-contingent benefits 
as a proportion of (pre-reform) net household income, by deciles of income (adjusted 
for household composition), for couples with one child and for couples with two or 
more children. This makes it clear that the introduction of WFTC was the most 
important single element in terms of raising the incomes of families with children.  It 
also highlights how the effects of the changes were concentrated among poorer 
households.  For those in the bottom fifth of the income distribution, the rise in child-
contingent support meant increases in net income of around 10 per cent for those with 
one child, and over 12 per cent for those with two or more children.  
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Figure 2 
Increase in child-contingent benefits, 1998 – 2002  
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Authors’ calculations based on estimated entitlements calculated using TAXBEN, the IFS’ tax and 
benefit calculator, based on data from the Family Resources Survey 2002/3. 
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4. The impact on fertility 
Considering a simple economic model of fertility, there are a number of possible 
channels through which the package of reforms outlined above might impact on the 
desired number of children:  
· Families eligible for WFTC or income support will experience a positive 
income effect which, if children are a normal good, will tend to increase 
demand.   
· Increased means-tested government support is likely to reduce income 
volatility8 and this will also tend to increase the demand for children (see 
Fraser, 2001).   
· The increase in child-contingent benefits9 will lower the own price of an 
additional child for eligible women, increasing demand.   
· For women on the taper of the WFTC schedule, the fall in net wages will 
reduce the opportunity cost of an additional child and this will also tend to 
increase the demand for children.   
· But, for women who are induced to move into, or increase, employment by the 
introduction of WFTC (potentially anyone below the minimum threshold 
shown in Figure 1), the opportunity cost of an additional child will be higher 
and this will tend to reduce the demand for children.   
                                                 
8 Gregg et al (2008) show that an important effect of WFTC was to mitigate the negative impact of moving into lone parenthood 
on employment and income.  
9 Including the increase in support with payments for childcare. 
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In summary, the reforms will have positive impacts on fertility through income, 
insurance and price effects, but an ambiguous impact through the employment (or 
opportunity cost) effect.  Crucially, this employment effect is likely to vary between 
different sorts of (potential) mothers. 
For lone mothers whose eligibility for WFTC is assessed at the individual level, the 
labor market participation effects of WFTC are unambiguously positive.  The credit 
provides an incentive for non-working lone mothers to move into work.  Those 
working more than 16 hours prior to the reform may have an incentive to reduce their 
hours both because their incomes are higher and because of the negative substitution 
effect created by the taper, but the 16-hour condition in WFTC ensures that labor 
supply does not fall to zero.  All of the studies that look at the effect of WFTC on 
participation, summarized in Table 1, find a positive and significant effect of WFTC 
on the employment of this group (see also Brewer and Browne, 2006, for a review 
and careful comparison of these studies).  
For women in couples who are the secondary earner (as is typically the case), WFTC 
may actually reduce participation.  WFTC has the same income and substitution 
effects as for lone mothers, but women in couples may reduce her hours below 16 or 
leave the labor market altogether if the family will continue to be eligible for WFTC 
on the basis of her partner’s participation.  Fewer studies have looked at the impact of 
WFTC on women in couples, but most of those that do, summarized in Table 1, 
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suggest a small reduction in participation among women with employed partners, and 
a small positive effect for (the small group of) women with unemployed partners. 10 
Table 1 
The employment effects of WFTC – summary of evidence 
Study Methodology Lone parents Couples 
 
Blundell et al 
(2000) 
Use estimates from structural 
model to simulate likely 
response; looks only at initial 
(Oct 99) levels of WFTC 
2.2 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers 
0.6 ppt reduction in 
employment for 
women with employed 
partners 
Gregg and 
Harkness 
(2003) 
Apply DD methodology (with 
propensity score matching) to 
Household Labour Force Survey 
data 1992 – 2002  
5 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
parents 
 
Blundell et al 
(2005) 
Estimate DD model using 
Labour Force Survey data 1996 
– 2002  
3.6 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers working 16+ 
hours a week 
2.6 ppt increase in 
employment of women 
with unemp loyed 
partners; no effect for 
women with employed 
partners 
Brewer et al 
(2006) 
Estimate structural model using 
Family Resources Data 1995 – 
2003  
5.1 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers 
0.6 ppt reduction in 
employment for 
women with employed 
partners, 0.1 ppt 
increase for women 
with non-employed 
partners, 0.6 ppt 
reduction for all 
women. 
Francesconi 
and van der 
Klauuw 
(2007) 
Estimate DD model using British 
Household Panel Survey data 
1991 – 2002 
7 ppt increase in 
employment of lone 
mothers working 16+ 
hours a week 
 
Leigh (2007) DD model using panel data from 
the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey 1999 – 2000  
1 ppt increase in 
employment among 
lone parents 
1 ppt increase in 
employment among 
women in couples  
 
                                                 
10 The reforms other than WFTC mentioned in section 3 would have had very small impacts on participation of mothers in 
couples, and would have worked in the same direction, ie to discourage labour market participation for women in couples.  
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This suggests that the positive employment effect of WFTC (which would lead to 
reduced fertility) is less prevalent for women in couples than it is for lone mothers; it 
is therefore more likely that the reforms will have a positive effect on fertility for this 
group.  We provide evidence of this below, consistent with the findings from the US 
for EITC (Dickert-Conlin and Baughman, 2005), and we focus on this group in our 
analysis. 
5 Empirical strategy 
We would like to measure the effect of the reforms on childbearing among women 
who are affected by the reform, i.e.: 
E(N1 – N1’ | T = 1) = E(N1 | T = 1) – E(N1’ | T = 1) 
where N1 is the actual number of children within the group of women affected by the 
reform (the treatment group, T = 1) and N1’ is the number of children they would 
have had in the absence of the reform. 
Of course, E (N1’ | T = 1) is not known since there is no way of knowing how many 
children the treatment group would have had in the absence of the reform.  The 
difference- in-difference approach uses the change in fertility over the same period of 
a control group who were unaffected by the reform to proxy for the change that 
otherwise would have occurred within the treatment group in the absence of the 
reform.  Applying this change to the initial fertility level of the treatment group gives 
an estimate of E (N1’ | T = 1). 
The DD approach therefore measures the following: 
[E(N1 | T = 1) – E(N0 | T = 1)] – [E (N1 | T = 0) – E(N0 | T = 0)]  
where N0 is the number of children prior to the reform and T = 0 contains the control 
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group who are unaffected by the reform.   
We exploit the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households to define 
treatment and control groups.  However, while household incomes are likely to be 
strongly correlated with the reforms’ impact, they are also likely to be endogenous 
and affected by impact of the reforms on both employment and fertility.  Instead we 
use education as a time- invariant proxy for income to define treatment and control 
groups.  In the short-term at least, we can be confident that education choices are 
unaffected by the reforms.   
Our analysis focuses, first, on all women and, secondly, on women in couples for 
whom we can incorporate additional information on partner’s education to get a 
tighter definition of treatment and control groups.  In our all women sample, the 
treatment group includes women who left full-time education at the minimum school 
leaving age,11 while the control group is women who left full- time education aged 19 
years or more.  In our sample of women in couples, the treatment group includes 
women who both left full-time education at the minimum school leaving age and have 
a partner who left at this age.  Similarly, the control group includes women who both 
left full-time education at 19+ and who have a partner who left full-time education at 
this age.    
Compared to using income or earnings, the potential disadvantage of using education 
is that it is less strongly correlated with the impact of the reform.  There are some 
people with a (low) high level of education whose earnings nevertheless do (not) 
qualify them for tax credits or means-tested benefits.  Table 2 illustrates the extent to 
which our education splits pick up the differential impact of the reforms across the 
                                                 
11 The minimum school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15 from 1944 and from 15 to 16 from 1973. 
 18 
treatment and control groups.  As expected, incorporating additional information on 
partner’s education produces a clearer differentiation between treatment and control 
groups.     
Table 2 
Receipt of child-contingent benefits 
  
Split by woman’s education  
Split by education of  
woman and partner  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control 
 Woman left school 
at minimum school 
leaving age 
Woman left FT 
educ aged 19+ 
Both woman and 
partner left school 
at minimum school 
leaving age 
Both woman and 
partner left FT educ 
aged 19+ 
Proportion entitled to child-related tax credits or means-tested benefits 
Before .400 .121 .237 .098 
After .515 .186 .401 .141 
Mean weekly entitlement – tax credits, means-tested benefits and universal child benefit 
Before £51.64 £30.77 £39.00 £29.71 
After £69.74 £39.90 £56.76 £37.27 
Difference £18.10 (35.1%) £9.13 (29.7%) £17.76 (45.5%) £7.56 (25.4%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimated entitlements calculated using TAXBEN, the IFS’ tax 
and benefit calculator, based on data from the Family Resources Survey 2002/3. 
 
Identifying the effect of the reform using a difference in difference approach relies 
crucially on successfully controlling for everything else that might affect the fertility 
of the treatment group after the reform.  In our regression analysis we include a rich 
set of demographic controls, including age, education, numbers and ages of children 
in the household, region, housing tenure and ethnicity.  In principle, the inclusion of 
the control group is intended to capture the effect of other (unobservable) time-
varying factors.  But the control group may differ to the treatment group, both in the 
level of their fertility (which the differencing takes care of) and, more problematically, 
in trends in their fertility.  Smith and Ratcliffe (2008) show that the education gradient 
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in fertility has been relatively stable across recent cohorts.  However we explicitly 
allow for differential (non-linear) trends in the regression.  We also include a number 
of macro variables which may affect fertility, including male and female wages, house 
prices and regional unemployment and allow their effects to vary by education.     
As already noted, the DD methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual policy 
effects (such as separating the effect of WFTC from that of changes to income 
support).  Our estimate is therefore of the combined effect of the set of reforms 
introduced in 1999.  It will also include the effect of any other reforms introduced at 
the same time that affected the fertility of the treatment group (and not the control 
group).  In fact, a number of changes were made to maternity rights and child-care 
provision that may have affected fertility, including extensions to maternity leave and 
increases in free nursery provision. 12 In principle, all women were affected by these 
reforms, but in practice, the impact may have been greater for women in the low 
education group if they previously had less generous maternity provisions in their 
employment, and were less able to afford childcare.  If so, then our DD estimate will 
also include the differential effect of these other reforms.  We would argue, however, 
that the effects of these reforms are likely to be small compared to the impact of 
WFTC and the changes to income support.     
In principle, we would like to measure the effect of the reforms on the total number of 
children over the fertility lifetime of affected cohorts.  This would include older 
cohorts, who are likely to have already started their family formation process at the 
time of the reform, as well as younger cohorts who make all their fertility decisions 
facing the post-reform financial incentives.  In practice, we do not have sufficient 
                                                 
12 See Hills and Waldfogel (2004) for a summary. 
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number of years’ data after the reform to look at completed fertility for affected 
cohorts.  Also, even if the data were available, it would be hard to attribute changes in 
fertility across cohorts separated by several years to a discrete policy reform.    
Instead, we define the variable of interest as the probability of having a birth during 
the previous year, and compare the changes in these birth probabilities before and 
after the reform for the treatment and control groups.  This means that we cannot fully 
distinguish whether an observed effect is due to changes in the total number of births 
or changes in timing, although we attempt to do so by looking at the age at first birth.   
A final issue relates to the definition of the “before” and “after” periods in 
determining the effect of the reform.  WFTC was announced in March 1998 and 
introduced in October 1999.  Assuming no announcement effects – as if the reform 
came as complete surprise in October 1999 - the reform would first have affected 
births from August 2000.  We therefore include women interviewed between 1st April 
1995 and 30th June 2000 in the “before” sample,13 and women interviewed between 
1st August 2001 and 31st December 2003 in the “after” sample.14  For women 
interviewed between 1st July 2000 and 31st July 2001, the introduction of the reform 
(plus nine months) occurs in the middle of the twelve month period prior to their 
interview and so they are omitted from the analysis.   
What if there is an effect arising from announcement?  This could increase births in 
the immediate before period if women respond to the announcement of the reforms 
rather than (or as well as) their implementation.  This is not implausible.  The Labour 
government took office in 1997 promising big increases in financial support for low-
                                                 
13 We choose end of June rather than end of July to allow for premature births 
14 Further reforms we re made to the system of child -contingent benefits from this time. 
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income families, and the reforms were announced in March 1998.   So long as the 
promised increase in benefits is credible, then the loss arising from the gap between 
announcement and implementation would be relatively small compared to the 
expected increase in benefits over the child’s lifetime.  Alternatively, after 
announcement, women could decide to delay childbearing until after the reforms were 
implemented, which would tend to decrease births in the immediate before period (an 
effect similar to “Ashenfelter’s dip”, see Ashenfelter, 1978).  In either case, failing to 
take account of a possible announcement effect would bias our estimate of the effect 
of the reforms.  We therefore test the sensitivity of our results to possible 
announcement effects by trimming the before sample at 31st December 1998 (nine 
months after the reform was announced).   
6 Data 
Our analysis pools data from successive waves of the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES) from financial year 1990/01 until 2003/04 and the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS) from 1995/96 until 2003/04.  Both are large repeated cross-section datasets 
collecting a wide range of socio-economic and demographic information on, 
respectively, over 7,000 and 20,000 households each year.  The combined sample 
yields over 800 births each year, with interview dates spread roughly equally across 
the year.  While potentially attractive as a panel, the British Household Panel Survey 
(used by Francesconi and van der Klauw, 2007) has fewer than 150 births a year.  We 
focus on women aged 20-45; at younger ages, many women are still in full-time 
education, which means that our conditioning variable will not be exogenous.   
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The FES and FRS do not explicitly collect information on births or women’s fertility 
histories.  But we derive the probability that a woman had a birth in the previous 
twelve months from children’s date of birth15 and the date of interview after allocating 
all children in the household to their natural mothers on the basis of information on 
household composition.  Using this approach (the so-called “own child method” see 
Murphy et al, 1993) we also determine the number and ages of the children in the 
household twelve months before interview.  Birth probabilities estimated by this 
approach are potentially subject to measurement error due to infant mortality and 
household reconstitution.  However, low rates of mortality, and the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of children stay with their natural mother in the event of 
family break-up, reduce the effect of these factors in practice.16   
As a check on the validity of our data, we compare an estimate of annual total 
fertility17 derived from the FES/FRS with the official estimate of annual total fertility 
derived by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) from registration data.  As shown 
in Figure 3 our estimate derived from FES/FRS data picks up the main trends in 
fertility over the period – declining fertility over much of the period, reversed from 
2001.  If anything, the upward trend is under-stated in the FES/FRS, although the 
downward trend is slightly over-stated.  Our derived measure consistently lies below 
                                                 
15 Where this is missing, we randomly allocate a date of birth given the age of the child and the date of 
interview.  This is the case for all births in the FES sample and 16% of births in the FRS sample.  
16 Another issue that affects information on the number and ages of existing children at the start of the twelve-month period (but 
not information on births during that period) is that older women may have had children who have now left home.  We test the 
sensitivity of our results to restricting our sample to women aged 37 and under for whom this does not appear to be a problem.   
17 This is measured as the total number of children a woman would have over her (reproductive) lifetime, if she experienced the 
age-specific birth rates in a particular year 
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the official measure, which may reflect the narrower age range in our FES/FRS sub-
sample. 
Figure 3: Estimated annual birth rates 
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Figure 4 below shows the raw differences in birth probabilities between treatment and 
control groups each year from 1990/91 to 2003/04 (together with standard errors).  
These are based on a sample of 101,330 women aged 20-45, split between treatment 
and control on the basis of the woman’s education (sample summary statistics are 
given in Table A.1 in the Appendix).  We show the differentials separately for single 
women and women in (married or cohabiting) couples.   
The raw data provide slight evidence of a relative increase in fertility among the 
treatment group in the post-reform period (from 1999/00) – more evident for women 
in couples than single women.  It is clear that any increase among the treatment group 
in the post-reform period is not reflecting the continuation of a general upward trend.  
There was a decline in the raw differentials for women in couples, possibly due to 
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differential changes in selection into partnership over the period (Smith and Ratcliffe, 
2009).  In our regression analysis we include controls for age, interacted with 
education, as well as differential (non- linear) trends.  
Figure 4 
Raw differentials in births between treatment and control groups,  
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One particular issue of potential concern is if the reforms differentially affected 
partnership formation and separation.  Unlike traditional means-tested benefits that 
typically create partnership penalties, the incentives associated with in-work tax 
credits are ambiguous since they support one-earner couples and may make low-
earning males (financially) more attractive.  Anderberg (2008) shows that the 
introduction of WFTC was associated with an increase in the number of couples who 
faced partnership bonuses, although this was almost entirely offset by the increase in 
means-tested benefits that occurred at the same time.  Taken together, the available 
evidence suggests very little change in partnership following the reforms (see Gregg 
et al, 2009).  There may have been a change in selection into couples on the basis of 
fertility intentions; our estimates will therefore include this effect.         
 25 
7 Regression results 
The outcome of interest is a binary variable equal to one if the woman had a birth in 
the previous twelve months, and equal to zero otherwise (Birth).  The basic 
difference- in-difference specification (1) includes a binary variable Low equal to one 
if the individual belongs to the low-education treatment group, a binary variable Post 
equal to one in the post-reform period and an interaction term Low×Post, which 
captures the difference in the change in birth probability after the reform for the 
treatment group (compared to the control group) – our estimate of the effect of the 
reform. 
 ( )1 2 3it it it it ititBirth Low Post Low Post X ua b b b d= + ´ + + + +  (1) 
Xit is a vector of characteristics which are assumed to affect fertility.  These include a 
cubic in the woman’s age (at the start of the twelve month period), interacted with 
education; the number of children in the household (at the start of the twelve month 
period), interacted with the woman’s age and with the woman’s age and education 
and with the age of the youngest child; region and housing tenure. 
We estimate equation (1) using a linear probability model for ease of interpretation of 
the coefficients.18  Our preliminary results, reported in Table 3,19 confirm that there is 
a bigger increase in births among women in couples than among single women.  
When we define the treatment and control groups more tightly for the sample of 
women in couples using additional evidence on partner’s education, 20 the estimated 
                                                 
18 The average estimated marginal effects from a probit regression are very similar and these results are 
available on request. 
19 A full set of coefficients is given in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
20 Details on this sub-sample are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix 
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coefficient increases and becomes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient indicates a fairly large response to the reforms.  The 
probability of birth among the treatment group in the pre-reform period was 0.089, so 
a 1.3 percentage point rise would imply an increase of around 15 per cent.      
Table 3: Linear model, births  
Dependent variable: Birth in the last twelve months (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample All women sample, split by woman’s 
education 
 Pooled Women in 
couples 
Single 
women 
Women in couples 
sample, split by 
woman’s and 
partner’s education  
Low × Post .0045 
(.0034) 
.0083* 
(.0050) 
.0021 
(.0036) 
.0133** 
(.0064) 
N 90523 58770 31753 40416 
Notes to table:  
** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
All regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and a full set of controls for age of mother, 
education, age and number of children in the household, region and housing tenure. 
As discussed in section 5, we exclude women interviewed between 20th June 2000 and 1st August 2001; this 
explains the reduced sample size. 
 
Figure 5 plots the adjusted treatment-control differentials for each year (plus standard 
errors) once we have included the full set of demographic controls, together with the 
averages in the pre- and post reforms periods.  It illustrates the increase in the post-
reform period, particularly compared to the years immediately before the reform, 
although to a level similar to the early 1990s. The biggest increase appears to be in the 
first year after the reform, 2000-01.  There is some evidence of a dip in 1998-99 
coinciding with the announcement of the reforms; our main result is robust to 
allowing for an announcement effect, as discussed at the end of section 5. 
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Figure 5 
Adjusted birth differentials between treatment and control groups,  
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Robustness checks 
In order to attribute the increase to the effect of the reforms, we need to control for 
any change in births that otherwise would have taken place among the treatment 
group in the absence of the reforms.  Ethnicity may be an important omitted factor – 
there has been an increase over time in the proportion of births to women born outside 
the UK, from 12.8% in 1996 to 21.9% in 2006.  Ethnicity information is only 
available from 1995 but running a regression over this shorter period and including 
ethnicity controls21 has almost no effect on the estimated treatment effect (Column (2) 
of Table 4).    
                                                 
21 The ethnicity information is fairly crude; we include indicators if the woman or her partner is Black, 
Chinese, Indian, Pakistani or Other (non-white).  Many of the recent births to women born outside the 
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We also test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of differential trends and 
macro factors.  We allow for differential linear and quadratic trends and a number of 
macro controls, including the lag of log real house prices at the regional level and 
lagged male and female regional unemployment rates.  We allow the effects of these 
variables to vary by education.  We also include the (lag of the) 25th and 75th 
percentile of the female and male wage distributions, matched to the treatment and 
control groups respectively. 22   
The results from these specifications are included in Table 4.  Column (1), panels (b) 
and (c) show the results of including differential linear and quadratic trends, while 
Column (3) adds the macro controls.  The effect of these additional variables is to 
increase the standard error making it harder to identify a statistically significant effect, 
but the magnitude of the coefficient is reasonably robust.     
 
                                                                                                                                            
UK are to recent white immigrants from the eight EU accession countries (including Poland, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia). However, this wave of 
immigration occurred after the end of our period of analysis (beginning in May 2004).  
22 Wages, house prices and unemployment are identified by Ermisch (1988) as important determinants 
of fertility.   
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Table 4: Linear model, births  
 
Dependent variable: Birth in the last twelve months (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Women in couples, 
1990-2003 
Women in couples, 
1995-2003 
Women in couples, 
1990-2003 
Panel (a) No trend 
Low × Post .0133** 
(.0064) 
.0129** 
(.0066) 
.0174* 
(.0098) 
Ethnicity indicators No Yes No 
Macro variables No No Yes 
Panel (b) Differential linear trend 
Low × Post .0115 
(.0102) 
.0116 
(.0136) 
.0264** 
(.0129) 
Trend -.0003 
(.0012) 
-.0007 
(.0020) 
.0045 
(.0028) 
Diff trend .0003 
(.0014) 
.0003 
(.0024) 
-.0026 
(.0022) 
Ethnicity indicators No Yes No 
Macro variables No No Yes 
Panel (c) Differential non-linear trends 
Low × Post .0096 
(.0161) 
 .0087 
(.0178) 
Trend .0000 
(.0047) 
 .0102 
(.0075) 
Trend squared -.0000 
(.0003) 
 -.0003 
(.0004) 
Diff trend -.0004 
(.0053) 
 -.0134* 
(.0079) 
(Diff trend) squared -.0000 
(.0003) 
 .0006 
(.0005) 
Ethnicity indicators No Yes No 
Macro variables No No Yes 
N 40416 34416 40465 
Notes to table:  
** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
All regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and a full set of controls for age of mother, education, 
age and number of children in the household, region and housing tenure. 
Macro variables are lagged log real regional house prices and regional male and female unemployment rates and 
male and female wage rates.  
As discussed in section 5, we exclude women interviewed between 20th June 2000 and 1st August 2001; this 
explains the reduced sample size.  
 
Allowing for heterogeneous effects 
A number of previous studies have found fe rtility responses to vary by birth order.  
Laroque and Salanie (2008), for example, find a stronger effect of the French 
Allocation Parentale d’Education on first and third births.  This may reflect a natural 
break for women with very young children and/or strong preferences over family size.  
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If so, the decision whether to have children (or at least when to begin having them) 
may be more susceptible to financial incentives than the decision over how many to 
have, once childbearing has begun. 
To explore this, we interact our indicator of the treatment effect with an indicator for 
whether or not the woman had children at the beginning of the twelve-month period, 
and with indicators for the number of children.  The results, reported in Table 5, 
support previous findings of a stronger effect for first births, and also for third births.  
However, the differences by number of previous births are not statistically significant. 
Table 5: Linear model, births  
 
Sample: Women in couples aged 20-45, 1990-2003 
Dependent variable: Birth in the last twelve months (0/1) 
 (1) (2) 
Low×Post×No_children .0213** 
(.0096) 
.0213** 
(.0096) 
Low×Post×Children .0110* 
(.0064) 
[0.2758] 
 
Low×Post×One_child  .0081 
(.0097) 
[0.2807] 
Low×Post×Two_children  .0140** 
(.0068) 
[0.4756] 
Low×Post×Threeplus_children  .0091 
(.0077) 
[0.2509] 
N 40416 40416 
Notes to table: 
** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  Figure in 
square brackets is p-value for the test that the effect is the same as for no_children.  
Regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and a full set of controls for age of mother, 
education, age and number of children in the household, region and housing tenure. 
 
 31 
Further evidence from the fertility tree 
Whether or not a woman gives birth is not a single decision, but is the outcome of a 
series of related decisions that make up the “fertility decision tree” (Levine, 2002) – 
including choices surrounding conception and contraception and whether or not to 
abort a pregnancy.  Levine (2002, p. 1) argues that “consistent findings [from 
different stages of this decision tree] provide stronger evidence of a causal link [from 
policy to fertility] than focusing on just one stage.”  Finally, therefore, we present 
additional supporting evidence from another stage of the fertility tree – use of 
contraception.   
The 1998 and 2002 UK General Household Surveys contained modules on 
contraception use.  We define a binary variable equal to one if the woman reports that 
she is currently not using contraception either because she is already pregnant or 
because she wants to get pregnant.  We estimate a linear probability model using the 
same basic difference-in-difference specification (1). 
The results are reported in Table 6.  They are fully consistent with the findings for 
births.  There was an increase in the proportion of women in the treatment group 
reporting that they were not using contraception because they were trying to get – or 
already were – pregnant.  This increase is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Further analysis by the number of births the woman has already had (column (2)), 
shows that, as with actual births, the increases were greatest for women who had 
previously had no and two births, although as before the differences between the 
effects are not statistically significant.   
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Table 6: Linear model, contraceptive use 
Sample: Women in couples aged 20-45, 1998, 2002 
Dependent variable: Not using contraception because pregnant or wanting to get pregnant (0/1) 
 (1) (2) 
Low×Post .0422* 
(.0252) 
 
Low×Post×No_births  .0674* 
(.0378) 
Low×Post×One_birth  .0166 
(.0371) 
[0.2406] 
Low×Post×Two_births  .0496* 
(.0308) 
[0.6414] 
Low×Post×Threeplus_births  .0335 
(.0344) 
[0.4091] 
N 2098 2098 
Notes to table: 
* indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.  Figure in square brackets is the p-
value for the test that the effect is the same as for no_births.  
Treatment and control groups defined on the basis of woman’s and partner’s education, as above. 
Regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and controls for age, education and number 
of previous births. 
 
Timing or quantity effects? 
At least some of the increase in births after the reforms may reflect women beginning 
childbearing earlier.  In order to shed some light on this, we look at the age at which 
women had their first birth.  Regression results are reported in Table 7.  The simple 
difference- in-difference specification indicates an increase in age at first birth, 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.  Including differential trends, the 
estimated treatment effect is negative, but statistically insignificant.23   
                                                 
23 Adding a differential quadratic trend has little effect. 
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However, looking at (conditional) means may not be appropriate when the shape of 
the distribution of age at first birth for the low education group has changed over the 
period to being bi-modal (see Figure 6).  We therefore also try estimating a 25th 
quantile regression (column (3)) which shows a fairly big, although statistically 
insignificant, decline in age at first birth.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
the reforms may have had an effect in bringing forward births among younger 
mothers in the treatment group.    
Table 7: Linear model, age at first birth  
Sample: Women in couples aged 20-45, 1990-2003, first birth in previous 12 months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS 25th quantile 
regression 
Low × Post .7424* 
(.5517) 
-.6807 
(.8407) 
-1.3529 
(1.0966) 
Differential Trends None Linear Linear 
N 1349 1349 1349 
Notes to table: 
* indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.   
Regressions include a dummy for the post-reform period and controls for education, region and 
housing tenure.  
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Figure 6 
Distribution of age at first birth, by education  
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8 Discussion and conclusions 
The reforms that took place in the UK in 1999 make an excellent case study for 
addressing the question of whether fertility responds to financial incentives, not least 
because of the scale of the increases.  Examining evidence on the response to these 
reforms, this paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the 
effect of welfare on fertility.   
First, we have shown that more generous government support coincided with an 
increase in births among the group most affected by the reforms.  This increase cannot 
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be explained by differential trends or by macro factors.  We have also provided 
supporting evidence of a decline in use of contraception among the group affected.     
Our results indicate a sizeable response in childbearing among the group affected by 
the reform.  The probability of having a birth increased by 1.3 percentage points 
among the low education group, equivalent to a 15 per cent increase.  This equates to 
nearly 45,000 additional births (compared to annual births of 670,000), although some 
of this may be a change in the timing of births rather than in the quantity.   
How does this compare with previous estimates?  Milligan (2005) estimated that the 
probability of birth increased by 17% for a $Can 1,000 increase in total support via 
the Allowance for Newborn Children; in the UK, the increase in annual benefits for 
the low-education group was around twice this level – potentially for each year of the 
child’s life (see Table 2). Our estimated effect is considerably smaller than this 
Canadian study.  We do not directly estimate an elasticity, but since entitlement to 
benefits increased by 46 per cent among the low-education group, the implied 
elasticity is around 0.28.  This is greater than Baughman and Dickert-Conlin found for 
EITC in the US, but within the range estimated by Whittington et al, 1990, and 
Whittington, 1992.  We therefore believe our estimate of the effect to be plausible.   
Second, we have shown that examining the fertility effects of welfare reform must 
take account of potential differences across women. In-work tax credits such as 
WFTC and EITC have potentially ambiguous effects because they may raise the 
opportunity cost of having children.  We argue that the pro-fertility effect is likely to 
be stronger for women in couples, and provide evidence to support this, consistent 
with earlier findings from the US.  
Finally, we have added some support to the growing evidence that effects vary by 
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birth order, and are typically stronger for first births than for subsequent births.  One 
implication of this is that the reforms had an effect on the fertility decisions of 
households who were not (yet) receiving the benefits.  However, McKay, 2000 and 
2001, shows that there was a fairly high level of awareness of the new benefits even 
among those who were not receiving it, which may have come about as a result of the 
extensive television advertising and/or through word-of-mouth.24   
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Table A1 
Summary sample statistics 
 All women sample  Women in couples 
sample 
Mean age  32.00 33.26 
Proportion in a couple 0.647 1.00 
Proportion with birth in previous 12 months 0.066 0.086 
Mean number of children 1.22 1.48 
Left school at minimum school leaving age 0.662 0.715 
Left full-time education aged 19+ 0.338 0.285 
No. observations – total 101,330 45,024 
1990/01 2,293 1,115 
1991/02 2,432 1,203 
1992/03 2,434 1,138 
1993/04 2,334 1,064 
1994/05 2,363 1,065 
1995/06 10,470 4,771 
1996/07 10,267 4,637 
1997/08 9,386 4,256 
1998/09 9,219 4,060 
1999/00 9,895 4,294 
2000/01 9,410 4,064 
2001/02 10,715 4,655 
2002/03 11,020 4,760 
2003/04 11,486 4,931 
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Table A2 
Regression results, linear probability model 
Sample: Women in couples aged 20-45, 1990-2003 
Dependent variable: Birth in the last twelve months (0/1) 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Low × Post  0.0133 0.0064 0.0158 0.0101 
Age × High  -0.0627 0.0406 -0.0669 0.0421 
Age × Low 0.0351 0.0276 0.0316 0.0290 
Age × 1child × High 0.2119 0.0928 0.2010 0.0961 
Age × 2children × High 0.1524 0.1113 0.1240 0.1153 
Age × 3+children × High -0.0265 0.2272 -0.0381 0.2350 
Age × 1child × Low 0.0565 0.0410 0.0814 0.0433 
Age × 2children × Low -0.0229 0.0443 -0.0123 0.0466 
Age × 3+children × Low -0.0570 0.0648 -0.0470 0.0682 
Age2 × High 0.0343 0.0131 0.0357 0.0136 
Age2 × Low -0.0130 0.0089 -0.0125 0.0093 
Age2 × 1child × High -0.0703 0.0283 -0.0659 0.0293 
Age2 × 2children × High  -0.0655 0.0323 -0.0581 0.0335 
Age2 × 3+children × High  -0.0128 0.0635 -0.0104 0.0656 
Age2 × 1child × Low -0.0196 0.0130 -0.0263 0.0137 
Age2 × 2children × Low 0.0044 0.0138 0.0019 0.0145 
Age2 × 3+children × Low 0.0160 0.0197 0.0135 0.0207 
Age3 × High -0.0049 0.0014 -0.0051 0.0014 
Age3 × Low 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010 
Age3 × 1child × High 0.0074 0.0028 0.0069 0.0029 
Age3 × 2children × High  0.0081 0.0031 0.0075 0.0032 
Age3 × 3+children × High  0.0032 0.0059 0.0030 0.0061 
Age3 × 1child × Low 0.0022 0.0013 0.0028 0.0014 
Age3 × 2children × Low -0.0001 0.0014 0.0001 0.0015 
Age3 × 3+children × Low -0.0013 0.0020 -0.0011 0.0021 
1child × High  -1.9572 0.9982 -1.8798 1.0336 
1child × Low -0.5295 0.4171 -0.8238 0.4415 
2children × High -0.9229 1.2679 -0.5715 1.3117 
2children × Low 0.2100 0.4634 0.0753 0.4878 
3+children × High 1.0056 2.6876 1.1701 2.7779 
3+children × Low 0.5246 0.7002 0.3973 0.7373 
1child, youngestage_23 0.1480 0.0085 0.1429 0.0090 
1child, youngestage_45 0.0645 0.0110 0.0630 0.0116 
1child, youngestage_67 -0.0119 0.0123 -0.0152 0.0128 
1child, youngestage_89 -0.0192 0.0141 -0.0213 0.0146 
1child, youngestage_10o -0.0264 0.0111 -0.0280 0.0115 
2children, youngestage_23 0.0347 0.0079 0.0371 0.0083 
2children, youngestage_45 0.0164 0.0087 0.0127 0.0092 
2children, youngestage_67 0.0084 0.0094 0.0062 0.0098 
2children, youngestage_89 -0.0021 0.0100 -0.0029 0.0105 
2children, youngestage_10o 0.0005 0.0092 -0.0013 0.0096 
3+children, youngest age_23 0.0062 0.0099 0.0103 0.0104 
3+children, youngestage_45 0.0059 0.0110 0.0072 0.0114 
3+children, youngestage_67 -0.0205 0.0117 -0.0180 0.0122 
3+children, youngestage_89 -0.0122 0.0126 -0.0092 0.0132 
3+children, youngestage_10o -0.0154 0.0128 -0.0138 0.0132 
North East  -0.0231 0.0081 -0.0149 0.0180 
North West  -0.0066 0.0063 -0.0029 0.0157 
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Yorkshire & Humberside -0.0096 0.0062 -0.0045 0.0159 
East Midlands -0.0099 0.0065 -0.0057 0.0156 
West Midlands -0.0081 0.0062 -0.0057 0.0130 
East  -0.0036 0.0068 -0.0062 0.0120 
South East  -0.0034 0.0061 -0.0112 0.0102 
South West -0.0072 0.0064 -0.0088 0.0129 
Wales -0.0050 0.0075 0.0016 0.0166 
Scotland -0.0125 0.0061 -0.0068 0.0160 
Northern Ireland -0.0022 0.0111 0.0057 0.0203 
Social housing 0.0220 0.0037 0.0205 0.0039 
Private renter -0.0183 0.0050 -0.0201 0.0052 
Other housing tenure 0.0137 0.0189 0.0220 0.0209 
Low education -0.3534 0.4947 -0.6355 0.5357 
Post reform period -0.0099 0.0054 -0.0181 0.0115 
Lag ln real house prices   0.0010 0.0214 
Lag ln real house prices × Low   0.0252 0.0131 
Lag female hourly wage   -0.0175 0.0131 
Lag male hourly wage   0.0163 0.0110 
Lag male unemployment rate   -0.0160 0.3336 
Lag male unemp rate  × Low   0.0683 0.3646 
Lag female unemployment rate   -0.6570 0.7687 
Lag female unemp rate  × Low   0.5942 0.8202 
Constant 0.2948 0.4104 0.3012 0.5012 
N 40465  40465  
 
